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Abstract and Keywords

Cosmopolitan citizenship is a controversial notion. But it has also been taken to mean different things. In this chapter, I first outline three ways in which "cosmopolitan citizenship" has been understood. The first understands cosmopolitan citizenship as a legal-political ideal, as an actual political membership under a world government. The second understand the cosmopolitan citizen to be someone who is empowered and has the capacity to participate in global democratic decision-making and governance. I will call this the democratic conception of cosmopolitan citizenship. This is the conception of cosmopolitan citizenship associated with the idea of cosmopolitan democracy. The third sense of cosmopolitan citizenship understands it more metaphorically, to express a normative perspective or point of view the globally engaged individual should adopt. I call this the normative conception of cosmopolitan citizenship. This is the conception of cosmopolitan citizenship that is assumed when invoked in discussions of cosmopolitan justice. I grant that while the legal-political and democratic conceptions of cosmopolitan citizenship are questionable, the normative conception is a coherent and morally galvanizing ideal.

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*THE term 'cosmopolitan citizen' calls to mind a broad-minded and morally progressive individual capable of transcending her parochial ties and personal interests to include humanity as a whole within her moral horizon. It is thus a rather fashionable idea in some circles of public discourse. But cosmopolitan citizenship is in fact a rather controversial concept within political philosophy and theory. To complicate matters, it is often invoked by different theorists to mean different things. My primary goal in this chapter, which is largely a survey of contemporary approaches, is to identify and clarify some of the main conceptions of cosmopolitan citizenship in the literature, and some of the philosophical and normative difficulties that they (p. 695) face. But I attempt, in the last part of the chapter, a defense of cosmopolitan citizenship understood as a normative ideal.

The central difficulty with the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship in fact engages the very idea of citizenship itself. Standardly, citizenship is understood as an inherently bounded concept, tied to membership in a political society. Is cosmopolitan citizenship then necessarily committed to the notion of a world state? Or can one speak sensibly of being a cosmopolitan citizen in the absence of a global political society, as an ideal independent of political membership? In part then, the discussion surrounding cosmopolitan citizenship engages the fundamental question of the possibility of reconceptualizing and recasting the ideal of citizenship.[1]

Varieties of Cosmopolitan Citizenship

To begin, let me identify and distinguish the main conceptions of cosmopolitan citizenship that one might infer from popular and academic discourse. The first, most immediate, conception treats cosmopolitan citizenship literally as citizenship under a *world state*. Citizenship is here understood in the traditional sense as a *legal-political category* tied to political membership. In this case, instead of the nation-state, one's political membership and allegiance is extended to a world government. Defenders of cosmopolitan citizenship in this sense are thus in the main proposing and defending the creation of a world state. While this is a straightforward interpretation of cosmopolitan citizenship, it is in fact not the version most frequently proposed in the academic literature. But it has its share of stalwart defenders such as Robert Goodin, Kai Nielsen, and Andrew Wendt.[2]

Another conception of cosmopolitan citizenship understands citizenship not in terms of political membership but in terms of the function and related capacities of individuals in democratic decision-making. What the cosmopolitan citizen is, on this conception, is not a citizen of the world in the legal-political sense, but an (p. 696) individual with the entitlement and responsibility to participate in global decision-making through new transnational institutions, empowered international organizations. There is no presumption on this view of a world state. In contrast to the legal-political conception of citizenship noted above, we may call this functional conception the *democratic*

conception. The main advocates of cosmopolitan democracy, such as David Held and Daniele Archibugi, have this conception of cosmopolitan citizenship in mind.[3]

Finally, cosmopolitan citizenship has been used in a normative sense. Here citizenship is used aspirationally to denote a moral perspective or point of view an individual should adopt when considering her moral obligations and duties of justice to others. It is an ideal of how the morally engaged person should view the world, that beneath our local and parochial ties like state citizenship and nationality, our obligations of justice to all persons in the world are fundamentally the same. There is no commitment on this account to a world state as such. This *normative conception* of cosmopolitan citizenship is found in the works of Martha Nussbaum and Andrew Linklater.[4]

These three conceptions of cosmopolitan citizenship can be distinguished as follows: the first associates cosmopolitan citizenship with a global *government*, the second with global democratic *governance*, and the third (primarily) with cosmopolitan *justice*. The main difficulty with the legal-political conception has to do with the practical and normative challenges surrounding the notion of a world state. The democratic conception avoids this problem, but, as we will see, it faces other difficulties having to do with the locus of democratic decision-making. The normative conception, as a moral aspiration, avoids the problem of the site of democracy, but faces challenges of its own concerning its potentially distorting (even if aspirational) use of the term 'citizenship.'

In this chapter, I will limit my discussion mostly to the democratic conception (since this is where the cosmopolitan citizen most frequently makes her entrance in the philosophical literature). I will conclude with some reflections on the plausibility and appeal of normative conception as an alternative.

(p. 697) Cosmopolitan Democracy and Cosmopolitan Citizenship

Cosmopolitan democracy is proposed as a response to the problem of global democratic deficit. The state-centric account of democracy, cosmopolitan democrats point out, is outmoded in an era of increasing globalization in which state borders and membership are becoming less and less central with respect to where decisions are made and how and where they impact people. For instance, domestic economic and social decisions and policies have global reach and effect. Environmental regulations, or the lack thereof, affect not just the country where these regulations are made, but also neighboring countries if not the rest of the world. Even when decisions with profound impact on persons are made by international institutions such as the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund, there is an absence of democratic input by those individuals who will be most affected. As David Held, puts it, 'the idea of a democratic

order can no longer be simply defended as an idea suitable to a particular closed political community or state.'[5]

Thus, Held and others like Daniel Archibugi propose, as an alternative to the traditional state-centric view of democracy, the ideal of cosmopolitan democracy. As the primary arena of human social, political, and economic endeavors is less and less limited to the confines of the domestic state, so less and less should the primary arena of democratic engagement be similarly confined. The idea that democracy is essentially a state-based practice and concept has to be replaced by an unbounded conception of democracy in order to face the new realities and challenges of a globalized world order.

Cosmopolitan democracy thus treats democracy as a transnational ideal in which individuals, conceived as global participants, engaged in deliberative democratic decision-making with each other on the global stage. Individuals are not merely democratic agents within their own countries, but are democratic agents in the world at large. They are to be empowered to have a voice in global decision-making through their participation at various transnational associations and institutions. Some cosmopolitan democrats propose, for instance, the creation of a world parliament consisting of representatives *directly* elected by individuals to complement existing international bodies such as the General Assembly of the United Nations that consists of representatives of nation-states.[6] In other words, individuals will (p. 698) assume certain democratic citizenship functions at the global level that are traditionally state-confined, such as electing representatives to world governing bodies. Held thus writes that '[d]emocracy for the new millennium must involve *cosmopolitan citizens* able to gain access to, and mediate between, and render accountable, the social, economic and political processes and flows which cut across and transform their traditional community boundaries.'[7]

The introduction of cosmopolitan citizenship animates a potential misunderstanding that many cosmopolitan democrats should want to dispel. Cosmopolitan democracy coupled with cosmopolitan citizenship calls to mind a democratic *cosmos polis*, a democratic world political order in which individuals are citizens in the ordinary legal political sense. That is, individuals are seen as political subjects of a world sovereign that has the capacity and right to make and enforce laws that are binding on all individuals in the world qua subjects. Indeed, cosmopolitanism itself is commonly associated with the idea of a world state, and this association is one reason why some commentators reject the cosmopolitan ideal.[8]

The idea of a world state is a controversial one, for both practical and normative reasons.[9] Immanuel Kant, his cosmopolitan credentials notwithstanding, is skeptical of a world state.[10] He famously argues in his 1775 essay, 'Perpetual Peace,' that a literal world state will be hard to achieve, and even if achievable hard to maintain given the vast expanse of the globe and the challenges of human diversity.[11] Moreover, if contrary to

expectations such a state is realized, it is realizable and sustainable only through some kind of global tyranny.

We must not ignore the fact that world statism has some powerful defenders in the literature, as noted above. But this is an outlier position among cosmopolitan democrats. Few actually defend a literal world state and a world citizenship conceived as citizenship in the ordinary legal-political sense in terms of a common political relationship. Most of them, like Held and Archibugi, refrain from affirming an actual world state. To the contrary, they quite explicitly state that their understanding of cosmopolitan democracy does not entail a world state as we ordinarily understand the 'state.' For Held, what cosmopolitan democracy requires primarily are trans-*national* institutions and organizations that transcend and cut across the (p. 699) boundaries of states. To put it simply, Held's cosmopolitan democracy is a call for more democratic world *governance*, not world government. Its attendant notion of cosmopolitan citizenship, then, is not citizenship in the standard legal-political sense, connoting membership in a political association and lawful subjection to its coercive powers. What the cosmopolitan citizen is, under this conception, is a *democratic* ideal. The cosmopolitan citizen is a participant in global democratic governance and who stands in relation to other individuals in the world as democratic partners but not necessarily as fellow subjects of a common political authority. What makes the cosmopolitan democratic citizen a *citizen* is her role and function as a democratic participant in global decision-making. We might say then, for a contrast with the legal-political conception of citizenship, that 'citizenship' here is defined in terms of an agent's democratic 'function' and not political membership.

The democratic conception of cosmopolitan citizenship takes it that meaningful democratic participation is possible and realizable outside the context of a political state as ordinarily conceived. Indeed, it is the motivation behind cosmopolitan democracy that meaningful individual democratic participation is not just possible but necessary beyond the confines of the domestic state. We can and ought to reconceive the traditional (state-centric) locus of democratic participation.

Yet this democratic ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship is less straightforward than might seem on first glance. According to some critics, the democratic relationship it depends on is not something to be taken for granted at the global level. Let us turn to one prominent line of objection against the democratic conception that I will call, for convenience, the liberal nationalist challenge.

The Liberal Nationalist Challenge

Deliberative democracy is 'a conception of democratic politics in which decisions and policies are justified in a process of discussion among free and equal citizens or their accountable representatives.'[12] Fundamentally, this means that a democratically arrived at public policy is one which all individuals who are affected could reasonably consent to.

According to the liberal nationalist thesis, this ideal of democracy requires, foremost, that individuals share a common language, a vernacular, with which to effectively debate and to collectively decide on matters that affect them. Moreover, democratic politics presuppose a sufficient level of trust and mutual (p. 700) respect among citizens so as to motivate them to honor democratic decisions that are not in their favor, on the understanding that should decisions be in their favor next time, these would likewise be respected. Most democrats agree that democratic politics is possible only if citizens adequately trust and respect each other; but liberal nationalists make the additional claim that a shared national identity is the source of this solidarity, the 'fellow-feeling,' necessary for generating and sustaining this mutual respect and trust among persons who are practically strangers to each other, as citizens generally are. I will elaborate on some of these points.

Before proceeding, it is worth reminding ourselves of the distinction between *liberal* nationalism and nationalism as such. Liberal nationalism takes liberalism as the starting point, and limits nationalist pursuits against liberal democratic values and principles. As Yael Tamir puts it, a liberal nationalist entity 'will endorse liberal principles of distribution inwards and outwards; its political system will reflect a particular national culture, but its citizens will be free to practice different cultures and follow a variety of life plans and conceptions of the good.'[13] Indeed, as we will see, one reason why nationalism matters (for the liberal nationalist) is that shared nationality provides the precondition for liberal democratic values and commitments. The liberal nationalist challenge does not oppose the global ends that cosmopolitan democrats aspire to. What it claims is that the (liberal) nation is the necessary setting from which to articulate and realize these ends and from which to best address the global democratic deficit problem. Henceforth, unless qualified or suggested otherwise by the context, nationalism implies *liberal* nationalism.[14]

Will Kymlicka writes that 'democratic politics is politics in the vernacular,' meaning by this that democratic deliberation is possible only among individuals who share a common language.[15] One reason for this is that people ordinarily feel 'comfortable debating political issues in their own tongue.'[16] As a general rule, only a minority elite can acquire equal fluency in more than one language. Most individuals are most at home talking politics in their own tongue even if they have competency in a second language. So to require people to deliberate in a language foreign to them risks a form of political elitism to the exclusion of the majority of a society. This, of course, runs against the democratic ideal. Kymlicka thus concludes that 'the more political debate is conducted in the vernacular, the more participatory it will be.'[17]

(p. 701) In addition to the common language that shared nationality provides, another crucial role nationality plays in servicing democratic politics is that it provides a sense of solidarity and unity that is necessary for generating the requisite level of mutual respect and trust among individuals. Democracy requires individuals to respect the reasonable views of their fellow citizens even if they are in disagreement with each other, and to only

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forward arguments and views that each can 'reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.'[18]

Fellow nationals are, of course, not intimate with each other as, say, friends or kin are. But fellow feelings, nationalists argue, need not be restricted only to people who are closely related to one another. Conationals see themselves to be part of a collective and common past and with a shared future, and even if they are not actually acquainted with each other, 'in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.'[19] It is for this reason that Benedict Anderson famously refers to the nation as 'an imagined community,' meaning by this not that the nation is a fictitious association that is unworthy of people's allegiances, but that it is a significant allegiance-generating association that is premised on a people's image or collective consciousness of its historic and communal distinctness.

In sum, as David Miller has long pointed out, democratic politics 'are likely to function most effectively when they embrace just a single national community.'[20] This is because the virtues of mutual trust and respect, moderation and self-restraint, and the idea of public reason are crucial for a functioning democratic political community; and common nationality provides the 'cement' for engendering and nurturing these virtues.[21] In sum, 'national political forums with a single common language form the primary locus of democratic participation in the modern world, and are more genuinely participatory than political forums at higher levels that cut across language-lines.'[22] Shared nationality provides the cultural linguistic basis for democratic deliberation and the source of democratic trust and respect among citizens.

The nationalist thesis makes the strong positive claim about the necessity of shared nationality for democratic relations and deliberation. But this positive claim rests on a weaker negative claim that the bonds of solidarity and mutual understanding necessary for democratic relationships are absent at the global level. The truth of the weaker negative thesis suffices to put the democratic conception of cosmopolitan citizenship under pressure.

(p. 702) As mentioned, nationalist theorists point out that nationhood provides the solidarity and common language necessary for democratic politics. Yet, as some have countered, 'the cosmopolitan governance proposed by Held is for the most part silent on' this crucial point.[23] What would serve as the basis of solidarity and common understanding at the global level among people of diverse nationalities? If individuals are to be directly represented at global decision making irrespective of nationality, it is not clear whether the linguistic diversity can be overcome, and whether the diversity in worldviews and affinities can properly support a democratic deliberative order that is based on mutual trust and respect across national lines. If we actually do establish, say, a directly elected world parliament, how likely would it be for, say, a Canadian to seriously consider voting for, and to do so in an informed manner, an Indonesian candidate given the linguistic and cultural barriers?

For example, as some commentators have pointed out, the European experience has shown this to be quite unlikely. In spite of the success of the European Union (EU) in formally bringing together democratic nations under a single political organization, the creation of a unified European demos remains elusive. The diversity of and challenges of national identification remain as obstacles to the formation of transnational European democratic solidarity in spite of economic and monetary integration at the level of Europe. As some commentators have suggested, most Europeans tend to see themselves as members of particular nations, rather than as members of a European polity.[24]

Extending direct democratic participation beyond national boundaries may also undermine democratic accountability. As Dennis Thompson observes, 'when we look at the experience of extending governmental authority beyond national boundaries, we cannot be encouraged by what we see. As the EU has gained more power and become more effective, it has also drawn more criticism for its lack of democratic accountability.'[25] The more we increase the number of decision-making authorities that are directly accountable to individuals, as the cosmopolitan idea calls for, the more difficult it will be to actually hold these authorities accountable. 'By its very nature, such a network [of regional and international agencies and authorities] does not give those citizens outside particular agencies or assemblies any significant control, and does not provide any way for citizens within them to deal with the effects of the uncoordinated decisions of other agencies and assemblies.'[26] The more we multiply democratic authorities, the (p. 703) more we undermine the democratic ideals of effective control and accountability. Thompson, in other writings, has aptly labeled this 'the problem of many hands.'[27] To be sure, the problem of many hands is not uniquely a problem for cosmopolitan democracy, for it confounds domestic democrats as well to the extend that there are multiple democratically accountable decision-making entities within a society. But it is a problem that is compounded when we extend deliberative democracy globally.

There is also the problem of fostering and securing a global civil society that can underpin a functioning democracy of individuals in the global arena. Democrats take as one important precondition for a flourishing democracy the presence of a flourishing civil society. Yet it is not clear how a global civil society could be engendered. Richard Falk holds out hope, cautiously, that a global civil society may emerge as a result of globalization, in that 'as the global village becomes more an experienced, daily reality,' individuals can come to see themselves as members of a shared community of fate.[28] This optimism presupposes that the sense of solidarity and common sympathies and fellow-feelings that are the preconditions of civil society can be engendered globally because of people's common experiences and realities as a result of increased globalization. Yet shared experience and reality alone may not be sufficient. A prior sense of identity may be necessary before individuals can come to appreciate and perceive certain experiences and realities as *shared*. Why, for example, would Americans attempt to understand the effects of globalization on Chinese citizens and to share in their worldview? The felt impact of free trade and economic liberalization for Americans and the Chinese workers

are quite different; unless there is first a prior sense of affinity and mutual feeling between the two peoples, experiences need not be seen as shared and held in common.

One might propose that shared values and causes could provide the glue to bind individuals from different nations together, thus creating the global civil society needed to ground cosmopolitan democracy. Held, in earlier writings, points to the 'new voices' motivated by shared principles in events such as the Rio Conference and the Beijing Conference on Women's Rights as hopeful signs of strengthening global ties and the founding of a global civil society. For more recent examples, one could look to The United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Paris in 2015 as a sign of the beginnings of a true global civil society based on shared interests and challenges. Held acknowledges that these attempts to create 'new forms of public life and new ways of debating regional and global issues' are still very nascent, and so it is too early to say whether these attempts to foster a global civil society will eventually succeed. Nonetheless, he thinks that 'they point in the direction' of such (p. 704) possibilities.[29] But in reply to Held, nationalists would urge that we should not be too hasty to conflate transnational activism motivated by shared goals and interests with transnational democratic deliberation. The former kind of coalition is unraveled once goals and interests diverge; democratic associations, on the other hand, ought to be able to withstand such value disagreements. Indeed, democratic associations presuppose divergent goals among its members, and hence the need for democratic deliberation to fairly and reasonably adjudicate divergent claims. The ties that bind a democratic order together cannot be secured by shared interests or principles for these are not robust and permanent enough to generate the kinds of shared sympathies, and mutual respect and trust, necessary for actual deliberative democracy.[30]

As an aside, it is important to note that the nationalist thesis does not deny that there is a global democratic deficit that needs fixing. They do not oppose the idea of greater global democracy as such. What they are skeptical of is that global democracy can be achieved through the direct democratic participation of individuals dislocated from local and national communities. Instead of supplanting and diluting national and local democratic relations, nationalists would call for the strengthening of the traditional sites of democracy at the local and national levels, and better international democratic institutions wherein representatives of democracies can engage in democratic decision-making with other national representatives. In short, global democracy is to be achieved by improving democratic relations between individuals at the national level and improving democratic relations between national communities at the global level. Global democracy will take the form then literally of an inter*national* democracy instead of a cosmopolitan democracy. More can be said about global democracy through international democracy instead of inter*personal* democracy); but the key point for our purpose is that this approach dispenses with the ideal of the democratic cosmopolitan citizen.

The negative claim of the nationalist thesis can be challenged of course. For just one example, Carol Gould has argued for the possibility of transnational democratic solidarity through increasing global level participation by individuals through different interactive

international organizations, networks, and governmental agencies.[31] This is a live debate, so I should not give the impression that the nationalist thesis cannot be refuted. But as things are, it presents a serious challenge.

(p. 705) Cosmopolitan Justice and Cosmopolitan Citizenship

Besides the legal-political and democratic conceptions, cosmopolitan citizenship has also been proposed as a normative ideal. On the normative conception, cosmopolitan citizenship is a metaphor for the moral perspective or point of view that the globally engaged individual ought to adopt.

The normative conception of cosmopolitan citizenship is thus an expression of a moral outlook or aspiration. It illustrates the ideal that we are to regard all persons in the world with equal consideration and respect. The normative conception need not be silent about institutions. To the contrary, as an entailment of its moral outlook, it can require that any global arrangements we establish and support must be justifiable to all affected. And it can certainly require the establishment of new global institutional forms if equal respect for all cannot otherwise be achieved. But, unlike the legal political conception, the normative conception is not tied to the notion of a world state. And to the extent that there are independent reasons for moral skepticism against a world state, the normative conception of cosmopolitanism, even though it can make institutional demands, will eschew the creation of a world state. The normative conception is primarily a statement of our moral obligations and only derivatively a statement about global institutions.[32] It carries no necessary legal-political connotations.

This is how some of the prominent calls for cosmopolitan citizenship are to be understood. Indeed, one of the earliest known utterances of cosmopolitan citizenship is intended in exactly this metaphorical sense. When Diogenes of Sinope offered that he was 'a citizen of the world' (*kosmopolitēs*) in response to the question as to his origin, his point was that his moral allegiances and responsibilities were not confined to the state of Sinope but owed to humanity as a whole. He meant by 'citizen of the world' a moral perspective, a way of morally engaging with and relating to the world, an engagement that is broad-minded and not parochial. In our own time, when Martha Nussbaum invokes the idea of world citizenship, she is not calling for the establishment of a world state. Her purpose is to 'make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern,' and to motivate us to 'base our political deliberations on interlocking commonality, and [to] give the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect.'[33] The invocation of cosmopolitan citizenship is meant to incite an expansion of our moral horizon and not a call to arms to bring about a world government.

Cosmopolitan Citizenship

The normative conception differs from the democratic conception as well. It does not conceive cosmopolitan citizenship in terms of individuals' capacity and responsibility to participate in actual global democratic politics. The cosmopolitan citizen, as understood here, is a conception of the individual for the purpose of cosmopolitan justice not for cosmopolitan democracy. It identifies a point of view to adopt for the purpose of assessing the rightness or wrongness of our current global conditions and of what we owe to each other in the world at large. The cosmopolitan citizen, in this context, is a person who is able to look past her local ties and interests, and to regard the whole humanity as her moral community. This is distinct from the cosmopolitan democratic conception of the individual as a person who is empowered and capable of actually participating in democratic global governance.

The above might seem rather puzzling. After all, some approaches to justice seem to involve deliberation, as in social contract theories of justice. That is, the social contract method involves deliberation, so it seems, among persons for the purpose of identifying and agreeing on principles of justice for their common social order.[34] So, at the very least, with respect to social contract theories, shouldn't the difficulties attending global democratic *deliberation* affect as well global *deliberations* about justice? Thus, it is important to clarify that these are two very different forms of deliberation.

First, unlike deliberations about justice which operate at the abstract level of determining general principles for the purpose of regulating the basic institutions of society, the ideal of deliberative democracy operates at what Gutmann and Thompson have called 'the middle range of abstraction, between foundational principles and institutional rules.'[35] To put this point across in Rawlsian terms, deliberative democracy is concerned with the legislative stage of justice, whereas deliberations about justice concern the basic principles that would regulate the social setting within which such legislative deliberations take place. As Samuel Freeman neatly puts it, deliberative democracy is a normative 'model of deliberation that legislative and other decision-making bodies are to emulate … As a model of decision making, it is to be distinguished from the theoretical construct of hypothetical agreement that typifies contractarian theory [of justice].'[36] The ideal conditions for democratic deliberation and deliberation about justice are quite different then, as are their aims. To put it differently, deliberation about justice aims to provide principles to regulate institutions, deliberative democracy aims to clarify the laws and rules of institutions.

This takes us to the second, and most basic, difference between the two kinds of deliberation. Democratic deliberation about legislation and institutional specifics is *actual* deliberation that takes place in real life and subject to real world limiting conditions, whereas deliberation about justice is hypothetical and idealized.[37] John Rawls's 'original position' is one famous hypothetical device of representation that which any person, 'here and now,' may utilize in deciding what justice demands.[38] The original position construction presents a deliberative model that is not limited by considerations of language, national affinity and so on because it operates at a level of abstraction that is independent of such real limitations. 'Hypothetical agreements (such as the original

position …) contain conditions that are not realizable in the world,' as Freeman writes,[39] but being hypothetical, these conditions need not be bound by real constraints. That is, the conditions for deliberative democracy, such as shared language, mutual feelings etc., do not apply to the construction of hypothetical agreements about justice. These are different kinds of deliberation for which different idealized conditions are required, and in the case of deliberations about justice, differences in nationality may be put to one side. Indeed, on the cosmopolitan approach to justice, they must be put to one side.

The above remarks are largely familiar, and hopefully uncontroversial enough. I draw them to our attention to clarify how democratic deliberation differs from deliberation about justice, and, more to the point, why the nationalist thesis does not trouble the normative conception of cosmopolitan citizenship. Any individual here and now may try to work out what cosmopolitan justice requires, since no actual deliberation is required. So the linguistic and cultural solidarity problems do not even arise. Just as it is possible for a single citizen to conceive behind the veil of ignorance principles of justice for her entire society, so it is possible, by extension, for a single person to conceive of principles for the world. Deliberations about justice are hypothetical deliberations rather than actual, and so unlike the actual deliberation of democracy, are not confounded by the real problems and limitations of language and solidarity identified by the nationalist thesis.

I have not given any arguments why principles of justice ought to be conceived on cosmopolitan terms. My main point is that the nationalist thesis does not threaten the normative conception of cosmopolitan citizenship. But this is not to say that the normative conception does not face its own challengers. Some commentators feel that this metaphorical, normative, use of 'citizenship' is more trouble than it is worth. Stephen Neff, for instance, thought that it is in the end unfortunate that (p. 708) cosmopolitans speak freely of world citizenship given the distractions and confusion this poses, when they mean rather generally the attractive idea of a shared humanity.[40] Indeed, the normative goals of cosmopolitanism, that of global justice, protecting human rights, and a more democratic global arena 'can be brought about in ways,' argues Neff, 'which do not require a distinct concept of cosmopolitan citizenship.'[41] As David Miller has pointed out, citizenship, properly understood, is a 'bounded' concept that expresses a membership in a distinct polity that comes with certain obligations in addition to rights.[42] To speak of cosmopolitan citizenship in the absence of a world state and a common political relationship between individuals in the world at large is a hazardous overextension of the concept of citizenship.

But why is a metaphorical use of citizenship unacceptable? Why is this a problematic overextension of the concept of citizenship? We do, for example, use the concept of university citizenship and say of our more selfless and institutionally responsive colleagues that they are good university citizens. Clearly we aren't imputing here some pretended political relationship among university colleagues. The term 'good university citizen' uses 'citizen' metaphorically, to describe a colleague who is devoted and

committed to her larger academic institution beyond her own personal projects. Not only is its use not misleading; it is actually illuminating.

It might be pointed out that unlike individuals in the world, members of a university are members of an institution capable of governance. Thus it can make sense to speak of a university citizen but not of a global citizen since the latter lacks common associational and institutional ties. But my reference to the idea of the university citizen is meant to draw attention to the fact that there are (seemingly useful) uses of 'citizenship' that are disengaged from political membership. The university is an institution and an association that is governed by rules and practices. But it is not a political association in that it is largely voluntary and lacks coercive power in the sense we attribute to the state. My claim is that the idea of university citizenship is (just) one instance in which the notion of citizenship can be deployed in a productive and non-deceptive way. The appeal of this usage (and similar others) is that it points to a desired moral attitude or perspective that one could adopt.

David Miller has raised additional worries about the value of cosmopolitan citizenship even in its moral, metaphorical sense. He argues that citizenship carries with it the ideals of reciprocity and accountability. When one acts as a citizen, one expects that one's actions 'are being reciprocated by many others.' Also, a citizen expects to be held accountable to others, and they to her 'for the arguments she (p. 709) makes and the actions she takes.'[43] These ideals are (perhaps) present in the ideal of the university citizen. The good university citizen is quick to reciprocate her colleagues, and also holds herself accountable to them. So perhaps Miller has no quarrel with using 'citizen' in this context.

But *global* citizenship would be another thing for Miller. It lacks both this reciprocity and accountability according to him. The institutional mechanisms for ensuring reciprocity and accountability are lacking at the global level, he believes. Accordingly, he writes, 'The danger is that when a concept is extended to apply in a new setting, it continues to embody assumptions that held in the original setting but cannot hold in the new one. Users of the extended concept are thereby misled, or perhaps self-deceived.'[44]

It seems reasonable to say that among the *sine qua non* of the concept 'citizenship' are the ideals of reciprocity and accountability. And it is a fair point that a usage of a concept, even if explicitly as a metaphor, that does not include its distinguishing features or ideals (the properties that make the concept the concept that it is) can be misleading and self-deceiving. At best, it is a very sloppy and distracting metaphor that has no place in serious academic discussions. At worst, we risk giving the wrong impression that we are committed to more than we really intend.

But are the ideals of reciprocity and accountability really abandoned when we use cosmopolitan citizenship non-literally, as in the normative conception? It does not seem so. To the contrary, these ideals are built into the normative conception itself. The normative conception, to recall, is an expression of the point of view that we are to acquire when we are thinking about the requirements of global justice and our moral

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obligations to all persons in the world. It is a feature of any theorizing about justice or moral responsibilities (whether this involves hypothetical deliberation or not) that, whatever principles we contemplate, these are principles that can be mutually affirmed by all who would be affected. Thus, reciprocity is simply a precondition of any theorizing about justice. And whatever arguments we could muster in support of these principles, they must be arguments that can survive the test of reason and potential counter-arguments. That is, when philosophizing about justice, accountability to others for the arguments we make is an integral part of the exercise.

Miller is right that 'it is wrong to think of global citizenship as though it were an alternative to local or national citizenship.'[45] As he puts it neatly, the ideal we need to strive for is 'not the global citizen, but the globally concerned citizen.'[46] This vividly states the opposition to the democratic reading of cosmopolitan citizenship. But as a normative ideal, cosmopolitan citizenship is not meant to change or displace the (p. 710) 'central arenas' where citizenship is actually practiced, pace Miller.[47] It is an expression of the moral perspective or point of view we ought to adopt if we are to be a *globally concerned citizen*.

My claim here is not that the rhetoric of cosmopolitan citizenship is necessary to the cause of global justice; other images are available. But it can assist that cause. In particular, it helps motivate the cosmopolitan approach to global justice which understands global justice to be primarily about how individuals stand in relation to each other in the world at large. Now, one will have no use for the cosmopolitan citizen (even as a normative conception) if one has no time for the cosmopolitan approach to global justice. For instance, one might instead prefer non-cosmopolitan alternatives to international justice as developed by Miller himself and Rawls.[48] Whether global justice should take a cosmopolitan or non-cosmopolitan form is an important debate that we unfortunately cannot get into here. But the reason for rejecting cosmopolitan justice cannot be that cosmopolitan citizenship as a normative ideal is an empty or incoherent concept. It will involve a more substantive disagreement with the idea of cosmopolitan justice.

Conclusion

Cosmopolitan citizenship has different associations and meanings. It is sometimes interpreted as a common global political relationship under a world state. That is, it is seen as a global form of citizenship in the ordinary legal-political sense. Few theorists in fact defend cosmopolitan citizenship in this sense. A more common conception of cosmopolitan citizenship understands 'citizenship' functionally in terms of individuals' capacity and responsibility to participate in global democratic governance. But this democratic conception of cosmopolitan citizenship faces the criticism that the bonds of democratic solidarity between individuals are hard to forge at the global level. Finally, another common conception of cosmopolitan citizenship is a normative one. Cosmopolitan citizenship is meant as a metaphor to capture the moral perspective that individuals are to adopt when determining their moral responsibilities and duties of justice to the world at large. There is the substantive question whether global justice should be conceived on cosmopolitan terms. But if global justice should indeed be cosmopolitan in form, then, as I tried (p. 711) to suggest, the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship understood as a normative ideal, is a helpful pointer to the moral standpoint we should strive to adopt.

To close, let me note some underlying and further questions of this discussion. Our framing question is whether the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship entails a radical re-conceptualization of the concept and ideal of citizenship. Is citizenship an inherently bounded concept, or can it be disengaged from its traditional (e.g. state-centric) moorings without losing its normative significance and meaning? Essentially, the introduction of cosmopolitan citizenship in philosophical debates must instigate a re-examination of what citizenship is and why it is of value. Also, the premise of the nationalist challenge, that shared nationality or membership in a societal culture is a prerequisite for democratic relations and deliberations, needs to be further scrutinized. Have the nationalists exaggerated the significance of shared nationality in this regard? What is the key relationship between nationality and citizenship? Finally, I had mainly put to one side the issue of world government and the legal-political conception of cosmopolitan citizenship that this would entail. But what are the prospects for world government? Could it be both morally attractive and a historical possibility? As mentioned, not many philosophers endorse the ideas of a world state and world citizenship in the legal-political sense. But there is room for debate.

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Notes:

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([1]) See Bauböck in this volume, for a discussion on citizenship as political membership. See Walker in this volume, for a discussion on the territorial parameters of citizenship.

([2]) Robert E. Goodin, 'World Government is Here!,' in Sigal Ben-Porath and Rogers Smith, eds., *Varieties of Sovereignty and Citizenship* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 149–165; Kai Nielsen, 'World Government, Security, and Global Justice,'

in Steven Luper-Foy, ed., *Problems of International Justice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 263–282; Andrew Wendt, 'Why a World State is Inevitable,' *European Journal of International Relations 9*, no. 4 (2003): pp. 491–542.

(3) David Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); David Held, 'The Changing Contours of Political Community,' in Barry Holden, ed., *Global Democracy: Key Debates* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 17–31; David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Daniele Archibugi et al., 'The United Nations as an Agency of Global Democracy,' in Barry Holden, ed., *Global Democracy: Key Debates* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 125–142; Archibugi, Daniele et al., eds., *Re-Imaging Political Community* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

(4) Martha C. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?*, edited by Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Andrew Linklater, 'Cosmopolitan Citizenship,' *Citizenship Studies 2*, no. 1 (1998): pp. 23–41.

(5) Held, 'The Changing Contours of Political Community' (n 3); Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities* (n 4). See also Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: New Press, 1998). Costello, in this volume, points to the international refugee crisis as another stress point for standard (state-centric) conceptions of citizenship.

(6) Archibugi et al., 'The United Nations as an Agency of Global Democracy' (n 3).

(7) Held, 'The Changing Contours of Political Community' (n 4), p. 30. Emphasis added.

(8) See example.g. the criticism in Danilo Zolo, *Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); Danilo Zolo, 'The Lords of Peace: From the Holy Alliance to the New International Criminal Tribunal,' in Barry Holden, ed., *Global Democracy: Key Debates* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 73–86.

(9) For a survey on the pros and cons of world government, see Catherine Lu, 'World Government,' *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalt, ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/world-government/ .

(10) See Pauline Kleingeld, 'Kant's Moral and Political Cosmopolitanism,' *Philosophy Compass 11*, no. 1 (2016): pp. 14–23 for a survey of Kant's cosmopolitanism.

(11) Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace,' in *Kant's Political Writings*, edited and translated by Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) [1775], pp. 93–130.

(12) Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 'Why Deliberative Democracy is Different,' *Social Philosophy and Policy 17* (2000): pp. 161–180, p. 161.

(13) Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 163.

([14]) I am indebted to Rainer Bauböck for reminding me that the nationalist challenge I am discussing is a challenge from within *liberal* nationalism. He also rightly suggests that the term 'democratic nationalism' would be more exact for my purpose since my discussion will emphasize democratic rather than liberal ends and values. But for the expediency of avoiding conceptual clarifications that are inevitable when new terms are introduced, I will stick to the standard label, 'liberal nationalism,' since it reasonably suffices for the present purpose.

([15]) Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 213.

([16]) Ibid.

([17]) Ibid., p. 214.

([18]) John Rawls, 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,' in *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 129–180, p. 140.

([19]) Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1993), p. 6.

([20]) David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 90; also Miller, 'Bounded Citizenship,' in Kimberly Hutchings and R. Dannreuther, eds., *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 60–82, p. 60–61.

([21]) See Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).

([22]) Kymlicka (n 15), p. 227.

([23]) Ibid., p. 239.

([24]) Richard Bellamy and R. J. Barry Jones, 'Globalization and Democracy: An Afterword,' in Barry Holden, ed., *Global Democracy: Key Debates* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 202–216, p. 211.

([25]) Dennis Thompson, 'Democratic Theory and Global Society,' *Journal of Political Philosophy 7*, no. 2 (1999): pp. 111–125, p. 115.

([26]) Ibid., pp. 115–116.

([27]) Dennis Thompson, *Political Ethics and Public Office* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

([28]) Richard Falk, 'Global Civil Society and the Democratic Prospect,' in Barry Holden, ed., *Global Democracy: Key Debates* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 162–178, p. 176.

([29]) Held, 'The Changing Contours of Political Community' (n 3), p. 29.

([30]) Kymlicka (n 15), p. 325.

(^{31}) Carol Gould, *Interactive Democracy: The Social Roots of Global Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). See also Daniel Weinstock, 'Prospects for Transnational Citizenship and Democracy,' *Ethics and International Affairs 15*, no. 2 (2001): pp. 53–66.

(^{32}) See Gillian Brock, 'Contemporary Cosmopolitanism,' *Philosophy Compass 8*, no. 8 (2013): pp. 689–698, for a critical survey of cosmopolitanism and justice.

(^{33}) Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?* (n 4), p. 9.

(^{34}) See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Another prominent example of the social contract approach to justice is David Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

(^{35}) Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 5.

(^{36}) Samuel Freeman, 'Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment,' *Philosophy and Public Affairs 29*, no. 4 (2000): pp. 371–418, p. 379.

(^{37}) Ibid., p. 380. See also Gutmann and Thompson (n 35).

(^{38}) Rawls (n 34). Rawls's original position procedure, to recall, conceives of parties to the deliberation about justice as free and equal. This condition of equality and freedom is ensured by means of the 'veil of ignorance,' behind which parties to the deliberation are to imagine that they do not know contingent and specific facts about themselves, such as their social class, the talents they have, their own conception of the good and so on.

(^{39}) Freeman (n 36), p. 379.

(^{40}) Stephen C. Neff, 'International Law and the Critique of Cosmopolitan Citizenship,' in Kimberly Hutchings and R. Dannreuther, eds., *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 105–119, p. 118.

(^{41}) Ibid., p. 119.

(^{42}) Miller, 'Bounded Citizenship' (n 20).

(^{43}) David Miller, 'The Idea of Global Citizenship,' in Sigal Ben-Porath and Rogers Smith, eds., *Varieties of Sovereignty and Citizenship* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 227–243, p. 242.

(^{44}) Ibid.

(^{45}) Ibid., p. 241.

(^{46}) Ibid., p. 242.

(^{47}) Ibid., p. 241.

(48) David Miller, *National Responsibility and Global Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

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